Outlines the history of the interaction between tobacco companies and government agencies. Describes the role of the Tobacco Insitute and the Council for Tobacco Research in research favorable to the tobacco industry, the "tar derby" of the 1950s, how the FTC comes to be involved in tobacco regulation, the making and impact of the 1964 Surgeon General's Report, and the background of he Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act and how the tobacco industry benefitted from the Act. Also describes other agency actions and the role of the Congress as well as the position taken by different industry groups. Concludes by noting how the industry has benefitted from efforts to regulate cigarette advertising.
Suggests organizational structure and responsibility of legal counsel at local, regional, and central oraganizations. General counsel to ensure regional lawyer takes account of "higher aspects...in the three areas of products liability, smoking ahd health regulation issues and new business development. Suggests formation of a legal strategy group. Recommends that tobacco litigation should be viewed as an attack on industry, and that responses should be coordinated with other competitors.
Enumerates types of documents concerning cigarette smoking, or the use of other types of tobacco products.
In light of concerns about the health effects of cigarettes Brown and Williamson will continue to make efforts to eliminate or filter nicotine, tar, phenol etc. though there is no scientific evidence indicating "that normally strong people require a cigarette substantially different from those we are now making."
Discusses need for Brown and Williamson to create a policy statement on the effect of cigarettes on health. Expresses wish to avoid a "yes but" posture and should aim to respond to consumers, not scientific reports. States that B&W health research is dictated by "consumer considerations". Suggests that company statement should be that smoking is "okay for strong, healthy people, maybe not for illness prone people (nobody likes to think of himself as weak)".
Asserts that, due to consumer concern about health effect of cigarettes, Brown and Williamson has investigated presence of harmful elements in cigarettes, but "found nothing". Claims that the few smokers who have fallen ill, would have been so without smoking, and "no scientific evidence indicates that normally healthy strong people require a Sanka cigarette." States that the policy of B&W is to eliminate or reduce the elements in cigarettes which some believe constitute health hazards.
States that Brown and Williamson and the industry hold that there is no scientific evidence between tobacco and health concerns. States that B&W does not accept extrapolation of animal experiments to humans. Admits existence of internal documents and research which are "troublesome" and which "evidence unalloyed health concerns." Declares necessity to formulate a broad company policy statement as will be consistent with a defense of product liability that can be used when needed and that should be agreed upon by the president, Advertising, R&D, and Law. Requests drafts of such a statement from recipents.
Expenditures made by Brown and Williamson for tobacco research are justified in light of the contributions that the Council for Tobacco Research has made. These include validating and lending credibility before juries the investigations by tobacco manufacturers particularly by the independent Scientific Advisory Board, in selecting research for funding, in providing independent research before legislative and judicial bodies, in persuading scientists of the credibility of efforts to enlist their support, in helping scientists to formulate research projects to throw doubts on anti-cigarette theory or to provide positive enforcement to the use of tobacco, and in positively interpreting data.
Dr. Gardner's request to conduct short term tests on smoke fractions should not be accepted as the CTR has invested a great deal in the inhalation programs that need to be finalized.
Reports that Dr. Gardner's proposal to undertake short term tests on smoke fractions was considered as unacceptable. CTR has been carrying out tests on cigarette smoke coadesate fractions, and the outcome of such tests should be awaited. Tests on mice through the CTR are red-light tests and may be harmful to the tobacco industry if known by legislators (Sen. Kennedy) and difficult to explain. The funding of work by several companies is unlikely to pose antitrust problem.
Objects to program of directed contract work CTR has planned. Recommends CTR be a granting organization only. Discusses work regarding testing cigarette smoke condensate for biological activity. Expresses concern that such 'red light research' might be harmful in the hands of legislators. Mentions possible meeting with lawyers concerning this matter.
Summarizes items for discussion at Boca Baton meeting including company response to the request of and American Tobacco's financial contribution to TAND, President Carter's letter to Congressman Fountain, possible hearing about oral contraceptive warnings, Federal bootleg bills, Californians for Common Sense, Californian distributors, CTR, and warning notice litigation.
Requests views of recipents as to whether Ed Jacobs should sit with the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). Notes Add is opposed to his inclusion. Notes status of AHH grants and that Ford's work has been modified to fit into the charter of CTR.
States that lthough the comments in the introductory parts of the ERF report are not supportable by the work done under the AMA-ERF grant, critiquing them, apart from being questionable if done by someone from the tobacco industry, requires much work, and is not worth the effort.
Attaches Bill Shinn's statement regarding the value of Council for Tobacco Research to the tobacco industry. Notes two particularly valuable aspects of CTR: 1) "the direct legal protection derived by Brown & Williamson and 2) "the political and public relations advantage accruing to the industry." Comments on "the value of having CTR doing work in a nondirected and independent fashion as contrasted with work either in-house or under B&W contract which, if it goes wrong, can become the smoking pistol in a lawsuit." Discusses the legal problems Liggett is having regarding an application for a patent claiming to reduce the "tumorigenicity of the total particular matter" of tobacco. Acknowledges that if CTR did not exist, "the government and the American Cancer Society would be the only game in town." Enclosures are not included.
The industry should accept the request to appear before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation to tell about industry sponsored research as refusing to so would leave the field open for Rep. Moss. The industry may present Dr. Cline a from UCLA who feels that cigarette smoking is not a big risk though he has not dome aany significant work on tobacco. He can also testify as to the philantropic funding of the industry.
The CTR to hold a budget meeting with all company sponsors following the Tobacco Institute meeting. The industry health research group has met twice generally reviewing industy research and recommending the replacement of the overage staff. The tobacco industry's tobacco program copares well with other industry research programs because it has concentrated on supporting independent smoking/health work.
Recommends approval of Dr. Theodore Sterling's budget request to extend current research through May 1981. Dr Sterling has continued to be helpful in frequest consultations about the smoking and health controversy.
The CTR's inhalation program is terminated as per decision of the Executive Committee of the Scientific Advisory Board. No findings of increased tumors or any co-carcinogenci property attributable to whole cigarette smoke. Bill Hobbs to assume chairmanship of CTR; Add Yeaman to approach Bill Gardner to see if latter is ready to retire, and Charlie Sommers to replace Bill Gardner. Severance amounting to one year salary and four years consultancy work suggested for Bill Gardner.
A list of events classified as plus (17 events including Epstein's paper and Wharton's study on financial impact of tobacco) and minus (20 events including Surgeon General reports, State Mutual Life Assurance Company study showing that smokers die younger than non-smokers).
Reports on Tim Finnegan's visit to Dean Sullivan, and believes he has "presuaded them to take a new thrust with their research...[which] will have questionable value but no negative." Also reports on some other projects. Discusses INFOTAB developments regarding social costs issues. Reports on work done to confirm Hirayama study.
Report of call made to Arthur Sevens on Feb. l1, 1983 regarding letters to media. While contact with media by CEOs is essential care should be taken in selecting the circumstances and approach. The better approach to take is that of challenging the Waxman-Hatch-Packwood bill on first amendment grounds rather than addressing he issues of heart disease and cigarettes.
Industry should adopt a new strategy in presenting its views. The Tobacco Institute has drawn much negative attention with its strident tone. The low key model of the liquor industry should be considered. Funding for a group of scientists can be considered as an alternative to the TI. Such group may have the right political environment if President Reagan is re-elected.
The report "The Functional Significance of Smoking in Every Day Life" should not be used by the industry because some of the authorities cited may not agreee with the conclusion of the report that smoking is a suitale coping aid in every day life. Furthermore, and more seriously, the report, by asserting that the primary motivation for smoking is the pharmalogical function of nicotine, presents an inconsitency among B&W scientists. There are also concessions about "tolerance and withdrawal. The report may give support to claims of addiction in litigation and heighten the possibility of FDA involvement.