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| "Can't stop the boy": Philip Morris' use of Healthy Buildings International to prevent workplace smoking bans in Australia Chapman S, Penman A Philip Morris set up HBI in Australia in 1987 with a grant and thereafter was its leading client. Many documents reveal the "HBI concept" and how this was played out in Australia and the region. Status: Published: Tob Control 2003;12 (Suppl 3):107-12 Simon Chapman's Group |
| “Australia is one of the darkest markets in the world”: the global importance of Australian tobacco control Chapman S, Byrne F, Carter SM Preface to the special Tobacco Control journal supplement published December 2003. Status: Published: Tob Control 2003;12 (Suppl 3):1-3 Simon Chapman's Group |
| “It is possible he is a kind of nut”: how the tobacco industry quietly promoted Dr William Whitby Chapman S Dr William Whitby was a general practitioner in Sydney who, from 1978 until about 1987, self published two books extolling the virtues of smoking and ridiculing anti-smoking claims. Privately the tobacco industry regarded him as "nutty", while nonetheless believing that his views should be promoted. They quietly supported him by distributing his book, offering legal advice, and persuading him to take media training. Many Australians would have been exposed to his views. Status: Published: Tob Control 2003;12 (Suppl 3):4-6 Simon Chapman's Group |
| "Keep a low profile": pesticide residue and additives in Australian tobacco Chapman S Objectives: To review the Australian tobacco industry’s knowledge of pesticide residue on Australian tobacco and its policies and practices on resisting calls by tobacco control advocates that consumers should be informed about pesticide residue as well as additives. Methods: Review of previously internal industry documents relevant to pesticides and additives in Australian tobacco located from the Master Settlement Agreement websites. Results: Between 1972 and 1994 Philip Morris Australia was aware that its leaf samples were often contaminated with pesticide residue, sometimes including organochlorine levels described by PM’s European laboratories as being ‘‘extremely high’’. Consumers were not advised of the contamination nor products withdrawn. From 1981, the industry also resisted calls to declare fully the extent of use and long term safety data on all additives used in their products. They developed standard public responses that were evasive and misleading and, in 2000, implemented voluntary additive disclosure which allowed the companies to continue to avoid disclosure of any ingredient they deemed to be a trade secret. There was extensive use of ozone depleting freon in Australian tobacco manufacturing. Again, the industry kept this information away from consumers. Conclusions: Australian smokers are unable to make informed decisions about smoking because pesticide and additive disclosure remains voluntary. The Australian government should regulate tobacco to require full disclosure including information on the likely health consequences of inhaling pesticide and additive pyrolysis products. Status: Published: Tob Control 2003;12 (Suppl 3):45-53 Simon Chapman's Group |
| The Australian tar derby: the origins and fate of a low tar harm reduction programme King W, Carter SM, Borland R, Chapman S, Gray N Objective: To document the development of the low tar harm reduction programme in Australia, including tobacco industry responses. Data sources: Tobacco industry documents, retail tobacco journals, newspapers, medical journals, and Anti-Cancer Council of Victoria (ACCV) newsletters and archival records. Study selection: Documents on the strategies and knowledge bases of the ACCV, other Australian health authorities, and the tobacco industry. Results: The ACCV built a durable system for measuring and publicising the tar and nicotine yields of Australian cigarettes and influencing their development. The tobacco industry initially sought to block the development of this system but later appeared to cooperate with it, as is evidenced by the current market dominance of low tar brands. However, behind the scenes, the industry used its substantial knowledge advantage regarding compensatory smoking and its ability to re-engineer cigarettes to gain effective control of the system and subvert the ACCV’s objectives. Conclusions: Replacement of the low tar programme with new means of minimising the harms from cigarette smoking should be a policy priority for the Australian government. This will require regulation, rather than further voluntary agreements, and stringent monitoring of successor programmes will be necessary. Status: Published: Tob Control 2003;12 (Suppl 3):61-70 Simon Chapman's Group |
| After the tar derby King B, Borland R, Chapman S, Gray N In 1998, the Australian Federal Minister for Health, Michael Wooldridge, began negotiating with the tobacco industry on "accountability for the health consequences of tobacco use." Using developments in British Columbia as an exemplar, Wooldridge sought industry disclosures on cigarette ingredients and mainstream and sidestream emissions of specific smoke components. However, the 2000 voluntary agreement covered only the voluntary disclosure of cigarette ingredients and a once-off public disclosure on cigarette emissions in 2001 covered only 16 brands. Behind this failure to achieve adequate disclosure was a concerted effort by the three Australian cigarette manufacturers and their transnational parent companies to ensure any agreement served their interests. Status: Working Draft Simon Chapman's Group |
| Going below the line: creating transportable brands for Australia's dark market. Carter SM Objective: To investigate non-point-of-sale cigarette marketing in Australia, one of the ‘‘darkest’’ markets in the world. Design: Analysis of 172 tobacco industry documents. Results: The tobacco industry has continued to market their products despite severe restrictions on legal marketing activity. They made careful plans to circumvent regulation well in advance. In preparation for bans, they chose and strengthened existing brands to enable their continued success in a dark market and prepared the consumer for bans by increasing their spending on below the line activities. Bans reduced the industry’s effectiveness and efficiency. After bans new brand launches stopped: instead key existing brands were strengthened via alterations to the product, line extensions, and stretching loopholes in the legislation as far as possible. In line with the general trend towards integrated marketing, a range of activities have been used in combination, including guerrilla marketing, advertising in imported international magazines, altering the pack, sponsorships, brand stretching, event promotions, lifestyle premiums, and the development of corporate websites. Conclusions: The tobacco industry acknowledges that marketing restrictions have an impact, validating their continued use in tobacco control. The industry is extremely creative in circumventing these marketing restrictions, requiring tobacco marketing regulations to be informed by marketing expertise, regularly updated, and to adopt the broadest possible scope. Tobacco control advocates, particularly those communicating with young people, could learn from the creativity of the tobacco industry. Status: Published: Tob Control 2003;12 (Suppl 3):87-94 Simon Chapman's Group |
| The Australian cigarette brand as product, person, and symbol Carter SM Objective: To examine, for dominant Australian cigarette brands, brand identity (overriding brand vision), brand positioning (brand identity elements communicated to the consumer), brand image (consumers’ brand perceptions) and brand equity (financial value). Design: Tobacco industry documents, articles from retail trade publications since 1990, and current brand advertising from retail trade publications were searched for information about Australian brands. Results: Cigarette manufacturers benefit from their competitors’ brand equity as well as their own. The industry sees Australian smokers as far less brand loyal and strongly oriented to ‘‘low tar’’. A few predominantly local brands dominate the market, with variation by state. Successful Australian brands exist in one of three categories: premium, mainstream, and supervalue. Their brand identity essence is as follows. Premium: quality. Mainstream: a good humoured ‘‘fair go’’ for ordinary Australians. Supervalue: value for money. All supervalue brand identities also include freedom, escape, mildness, an aspirational attitude, blue tones, and waterside scenes. Brand image and brand identity is frequently congruent, even when marketing is restricted, and brand image is generally more positive for a smoker’s own brand. Conclusions: Tobacco control activities have undermined cigarette brand equity. Further research is needed regarding brand loyalty, low tar, and brand categories. Smokers may respond more positively to tobacco control messages consistent with the identities of their chosen brand, and brand-as-organisation elements may assist. Further marketing restrictions should consider all elements of brand identity, and aim to undermine brand categories. Status: Published: Tob Control 2003;12 (Suppl 3):79-86. Simon Chapman's Group |
| From legitimate consumers to public relations pawns: the tobacco industry and young Australians Carter SM Objective: To document the Australian tobacco industry’s activities regarding youth smoking to support tobacco control. Method: 492 industry documents from primary and secondary websites were abstracted and analysed. Results: Australian legislation and rhetoric on youth and tobacco has changed dramatically over the last 50 years, from an unproblematic association of teenagers and smoking in the 1960s, through the industry’s aggressive attacks and denials in the 1980s, to the 1990s, when industry became newly compliant with ‘‘societal expectations’’ and youth became a dominant bargaining issue in the industry’s public relations strategy. The industry’s current policy is to simultaneously blame others for underage smoking, frame the industry as socially responsible via voluntary marketing codes, youth access programmes, and school education, and market actively to young adults. Conclusions: The arbitrary distinction between 17 and 18 year olds is, particularly in Australia’s dark market, a liability for tobacco control and an opportunity for the industry, which is attempting to claim the high moral ground traditionally occupied by tobacco control on the youth issue. The current review of Australia’s Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act of 1992 should prohibit all forms of industry communication targeting young people, including retail access and schools programmes and below the- line marketing. Tobacco control advocacy should highlight the industry’s attempts to use the youth issue in its own favour while laying the blame elsewhere. Status: Published: Tob Control 2003;12 (Suppl 3):71-78 Simon Chapman's Group |
| Cooperation and control: the Tobacco Institute of Australia Carter SM Objective: To describe the history of the Tobacco Institute of Australia (TIA), particularly regarding connections between local and international cigarette manufacturers and tobacco organisations. Design: Analysis of 4541 industry documents from the world wide web. Results: From 1978 to 1983 the TIA built strong international networks via ICOSI/INFOTAB and the US Tobacco Institute, and defended existing industry freedoms. 1983 to 1989 was the TIA’s aggressive heyday, led primarily by John Dollisson. From 1989 to 1994, following the decision in Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations vs TIA, local and international industry lawyers assumed control. Between 1994 and 1997 a brief revival led into decline and then dissolution, as previously common ground became commercially competitive issues for the manufacturers. The TIA facilitated interconnectedness: between local manufacturers; via individuals who played multiple roles; to international tobacco organisations; through the industry’s local and international counsel; and by acting as a conduit for information. Conclusion: The local tobacco industry was comprehensively informed on issues including smoking and health, and connected to the international industry, via the TIA. The manufacturers were closely involved in the TIA’s activities, and cooperated through the TIA in a manner detrimental to Australian consumers. The TIA’s conduct was the responsibility of local and international manufacturers and their counsel. Status: Published: Tob Control 2003;12 (Suppl 3):54-60 Simon Chapman's Group |
| New frontier, new power: the retail environment in Australia's dark market Carter SM Objective: To investigate the role of the retail environment in cigarette marketing in Australia, one of the ‘‘darkest’’ markets in the world. Design: Analysis of 172 tobacco industry documents; and articles and advertisements found by hand searching Australia’s three leading retail trade journals. Results: As Australian cigarette marketing was increasingly restricted, the retail environment became the primary communication vehicle for building cigarette brands. When retail marketing was restricted, the industry conceded only incrementally and under duress, and at times continues to break the law. The tobacco industry targets retailers via trade promotional expenditure, financial and practical assistance with point of sale marketing, alliance building, brand advertising, and distribution. Cigarette brand advertising in retail magazines are designed to build brand identities. Philip Morris and British American Tobacco are now competing to control distribution of all products to retailers, placing themselves at the heart of retail business. Conclusions: Cigarette companies prize retail marketing in Australia’s dark market. Stringent point of sale marketing restrictions should be included in any comprehensive tobacco control measures. Relationships between retailers and the industry will be more difficult to regulate. Retail press advertising and trade promotional expenditure could be banned. In-store marketing assistance, retail–tobacco industry alliance building, and new electronic retail distribution systems may be less amenable to regulation. Alliances between the health and retail sectors and financial support for a move away from retail dependence on tobacco may be necessary to effect cultural change. Status: Published: Tob Control 2003;12 (Suppl 3):95-101 Simon Chapman's Group |
| Smoking, disease, and obdurate denial: the Australian Carter SM, Chapman S Objective: To contrast the Australian tobacco industry’s awareness of the diseases caused by smoking with their aggressive public denial on the relation between smoking and disease in the 1980s. Design: Analysis of 325 industry documents from the world wide web. Results: In the 1980s Australian cigarette manufacturers were informed constantly by the international industry of the medical consensus that smoking caused disease. In addition Philip Morris (Australia) Limited received reports of Philip Morris’ international biological research programme and visited its Richmond research facility; and WD&HO Wills part funded, co-managed, and contributed research to the British American Tobacco groups’ biological research programme. Despite this knowledge, the Australian manufacturers had a policy of arguing to their employees, decision makers, and the general public that questions of smoking and disease were unresolved. The industry catalogued the literature, developed arguments against the main claims made by health groups, and attacked public health advocates who made statements linking smoking to death and disease. Industry studies suggested that a 20–30% minority of the Australian public agreed with the industry on smoking and disease, diminishing across the decade. Conclusion: Australian manufacturers were clearly negligent in the 1980s, deliberately working to undermine Australians’ understandings of the diseases caused by smoking despite their own private knowledge. Continuing scepticism about smoking and disease, corresponding with the industry’s deceptions, exists in Australian smokers today, suggesting that their actions may have slowed the rate of decline in smoking prevalence. These revelations provide important evidence for Australian litigation and advocacy. Status: Published: Tob Control 2003;12 (Suppl 3):23-30 Simon Chapman's Group |
| Everybody knows the risks: the Australian tobacco industry’s management of “the health issue” from 1990 Chapman S, Carter S Status: Working Draft Simon Chapman's Group |
| “The Scholem and Carroll cases, despite efforts to defend our loss, remain losers for the industry”: the tobacco industry’s response to Australian passive smoking workplace litigation Trotter L, Byrne F, Chapman S Tobacco documents reveal that the industry kept a close watch on developments in ETS workplace litigation. To defend their interests, the industry offered to assist third party defendants in legal cases. They also conducted a coordinated campaign to reassure employers that they need not introduce smoking bans, and they attempted to focus the debate on indoor air quality management. The tobacco industry continued to reject the conclusions of the courts that exposure to ETS was responsible for the poor health of workers. Status: Working Draft Simon Chapman's Group Marked as Private |
| Pleasure, habit, addiction: the framing, control and significance of nicotine in Australian cigarettes King B, Chapman S, Borland R, Gray N, Carter S This paper will discuss in detail tobacco industry practices in relation to nicotine and addiction. Cigarette design issues including the use of additives, public discussions of addiction and smoker responses to the question of addiction will be considered. The ethical issues relating to the marketing of an addictive product, with or without negative health consequences, will be summarized and conclusions drawn for communication about and regulation of tobacco in Australia. Status: Working Draft Simon Chapman's Group |
| The "low tar" strategy and the changing construction of Australian cigarettes King B and Borland R This paper documents design changes in Australian cigarettes since the adoption of a "low tar" harm reduction strategy in 1966. It also determines the relative contributions of specific technologies to machine-tested tar and nicotine yields in 1980 and 1994, using data from tobacco industry documents. Our findings are consistent with a 1st generation of "low tar" cigarettes, relying primarily on filtration efficiency, being displaced by a 2nd generation, relying heavily on filter ventilation, which were more attractive to consumers. In 1980, both tar and nicotine yields correlated most strongly with filter density (r= -0.66, p<0.01 and r = -0.70, p < 0.01), whereas in 1994 both tar and nicotine yields correlated most strongly with % filter ventilation (r= -0.97, p < 0.01 and r= -0.95, p < 0.01). We also found that median per cent alkaloid content of tobacco rods rose from 2.16% in 1980 to 2.4% in 1994, despite median nicotine yield declining from 1.0mg to 0.58mg. These changes can be expected to have reduced the utility of the FTC/ISO yield testing system. Status: Submitted for Publication Simon Chapman's Group |
| Chasing Ernst L. Wynder: 40 years of Philip Morris’ efforts to influence a leading scientist Fields N, Chapman S On July 14, 1999, Dr Ernst L. Wynder honorary life member of the American Association of Cancer Research, and founder of the American Health Foundation, died of thyroid cancer. Dr. Wynder had an illustrious career in epidemiology and cancer research, his lifetime work relating to the impact of smoking on health, widely known. In one obituary he was described as “the health conscience of the nation”. Philip Morris was renowned for the pursuit of big name scientists and Ernst Wynder was one of the biggest in their sights. This paper will detail the relationship that developed between Philip Morris and Dr Wynder, an association that spanned four decades. Status: Published: J. Epidemiol. Community Health 2003;57:571-78. Simon Chapman's Group |
| Urgent intervention required: influencing public policy in China Fields N, Chapman S In 1993, the Chinese Ministry of Health planned to conduct the biggest ever study of their population’s health. Prof. Peter Atteslander, an important industry consultant, informed Philip Morris of this upcoming activity. Atteslander, expressing concern about the impact of the results on future policy development in China, agreed to “monitor” the project for Philip Morris. This paper will discuss the development of Chinese health policy during this period and the methods used in an attempt to intervene in this process. Status: Working Draft Simon Chapman's Group |
| Scaling the Great Wall: how Philip Morris planned to infiltrate the Chinese Market Fields N, Chapman S It is well documented that the size of the Chinese market has made it an extremely desirable conquest for tobacco transnationals. This paper will chronicle the identified difficulties and subsequent strategies employed by one transnational, Philip Morris Inc., in an attempt to gain leverage into this lucrative market, “… a truly huge opportunity.” Status: Documents Collected Simon Chapman's Group |
| Care and Feeding: the Asian ETS Consultants Project Assunta M, Fields N, Knight J, Chapman S The release of the 1986 U.S. Surgeon General’s Report on secondhand smoke provoked tobacco companies to prepare for a major threat to their industry. Asian program activities included conducting national/international symposiums, consultant “road shows” and extensive lobbying and media activities. The industry also exploited confounding factors said to be unique to Eastern societies such as diet, culture and urban pollution to downplay the health risks of ETS. The industry consultants were said to be “… prepared to do the kinds of things they were recruited to do."2 The program was successful in blurring the science on ETS and keeping the controversy alive both nationally and internationally. For the duration of the project, it also successfully dissuaded national policy makers from banning smoking in public places. Status: Documents Collected Simon Chapman's Group |
| “… think big …”: advertising and sponsorship in China Fields N, Chapman S This paper will chronicle the advertising and sponsorship strategies employed by multinational tobacco companies in their efforts to gain entry, then a foothold, into the lucrative Chinese market. Status: Documents Collected Simon Chapman's Group |
| Untapped market: China, tobacco and trade Fields N, Chapman S After 15 years of negotiation, China was finally granted entry to the World Trade Organization in November 2001. This is a huge step for transnational tobacco companies who have been attempting to gain access to this market for years. This paper will outline how big tobacco used trade policy to open the Taiwanese market during the 1980’s and what this implies for the current China market. Status: Working Draft Simon Chapman's Group |
| Capturing the hearts and minds of Hong Kong women Knight J, Chapman S In a country where a small percentage of women smoke, the tobacco industry has tried a number of tactics to capture the hearts and minds of Hong Kong women. With the demise in advertising, below the line advertising strategies have been used to promote an image of independence and glamour to entice the young woman smoker. Status: Documents Collected Simon Chapman's Group |
| Marlboro Man takes on the paddy fields: US oriented marketing and promotion among Asian Young Adult Male Smokers Knight J, Assunta A, Fields N, Chapman S The mythical rugged, outdoors image of the Marlboro man may have some relevance in countries such as the US and Australia, both of which have strong cattle raising traditions. There is, however, little to connect the cowboy with the paddy fields of Hong Kong and China. Even so, the Marlboro Man is the image of choice for Philip Morris and its number one cigarette in Hong Kong. What is the attraction? Why does this image sell and sell over time and across ages? How does the company seek to reinforce this myth and entrench brand awareness among young adult male smokers in Hong Kong? Status: Documents Collected Simon Chapman's Group |
| Asia has become a focus of the global anti-smoking movement”: the tobacco industry seeks to discredit the Asian anti-smoking movement Knight J, Assunta M, Fields N, Chapman S As the tobacco industry targeted Asia for increased growth in sales, the region’s anti-smoking movement grew increasingly vocal, effective and cohesive. Throughout the 1980s and ‘90s industry employed a number of strategies to discredit the work of individuals and organisations committed to warning governments and an unsuspecting public of the dangers of cigarette smoking. This article identified the various strategies employed by the industry and provides case studies of each strategy. Status: Documents are currently being identified and analysed. Status: Documents Collected Simon Chapman's Group |
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